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█ Riassunto  Peccatori imperdonabili? Il naturalismo epistemologico e psicologico nella Filosofia come scienza 
rigorosa di Husserl - In questo articolo intendo presentare e discutere le tesi avanzate da Husserl contro il na-
turalismo epistemologico e psicologico in La filosofia come scienza rigorosa. Intendo mostrare come la sua cri-
tica si rivolga a posizioni generalmente più estreme rispetto alle varianti del naturalismo oggi dibattute; e 
tuttavia le tesi husserliane hanno implicazioni interessanti per la discussione contemporanea. In primo luo-
go, egli mostra come vi sia un nesso importante tra naturalismo epistemologico (la tesi secondo cui la validità 
della logica può essere ridotta alla validità delle leggi naturali del pensiero) e naturalismo psicologico (la tesi 
secondo cui tutte le occorrenze psichiche sono semplici eventi che accompagnano parallelamente le occor-
renze fisiologiche). In secondo luogo, egli mostra come una versione robusta di naturalismo epistemologico 
indebolisca se stesso, non riuscendo a traslare la cogenza logica in termini psicologici. In terzo luogo – e que-
sto è il tratto più importante per la discussione contemporanea – egli attacca il cartesianesimo in quanto 
forma di naturalismo psicologico per via del considerare la psiche come sostanza. Contro questa posizione 
Husserl afferma la necessità di formulare nuovi obiettivi epistemici per le ricerche sulla coscienza, sostenen-
do che il fattore di maggiore interesse circa la coscienza non sia la sua fatticità empirica, bensì la sua funzione 
trascendentale, che garantisce accesso conoscitivo a ogni tipo di oggetto (empirico e ideale). Lo studio di 
questa funzione richiede un metodo specifico (l’eidetica), da non confondersi con i metodi empirici. Nella 
parte conclusiva intendo sostenere come le analisi husserliane offrano nuove prospettive sulla struttura della 
coscienza, di cui oggi si sente il bisogno, ma anche argomenti persuasivi contro le incerte speculazioni meta-
fisiche circa il rapporto tra mente e corpo. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Fenomenologia; Epistemologia; Filosofia della Mente; Coscienza; Naturalismo. 
 
█ Abstract  In this paper I present and assess Husserl’s arguments against epistemological and psychological 
naturalism in his essay Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. I show that his critique is directed against positions 
that are generally more extreme than most currently debated variants of naturalism. Nevertheless, Husserl 
has interesting thoughts to contribute to philosophy today. First, he shows that there is an important con-
nection between naturalism in epistemology (which in his view amounts  to the position that the validity of 
logic can be reduced to the validity of natural laws of thinking) and naturalism in psychology (which in his 
view amounts to the position that all psychic occurrences are merely parallel accompaniments to physiologi-
cal occurrences). Second, he shows that a strong version of epistemological naturalism is self-undermining 
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and fails to translate the cogency of logic into psychological terms. Third, and most importantly for current 
debates, he attacks Cartesianism as a form of psychological naturalism because of its construal of the psyche 
as a substance. Against this position, Husserl asserts the necessity of formulating new epistemic aims for the 
investigation of consciousness. He contends that what is most interesting about consciousness is not its em-
pirical facticity but its transcendental function of granting cognitive access to all kinds of objects (both em-
pirical and ideal). The study of this function requires a specific method (eidetics) that cannot be conflated 
with empirical methods. I conclude that Husserl's analyses offer much-needed insight into the fabric of con-
sciousness and compelling arguments against unwarranted metaphysical speculations about the relationship 
between mind and body. 
KEYWORDS: Phenomenology; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Consciousness; Naturalism. 
 
 
  
█ Introduction 
 
IN HIS LECTURE COURSE Introduction to 
Logic and Theory of Knowledge (1906/07) Hus-
serl declares with his unmistakable gravitas that 
mixing up epistemology and psychology should 
be considered: «the specifically epistemologi-
cal sin, the sin against the Holy Ghost of phi-
losophy».1 Rudimentary knowledge of Chris-
tian theology suffices to recall that in the Gos-
pel (Mt 12: 31-32) sins again the Holy Ghost 
are deemed unforgivable.  
Considering the dominant philosophical 
trend of the past few decades, there are rea-
sons to be worried that down at the philoso-
phers’ hell there hangs a recently-posted “no 
vacancies” sign, and it would be no surprise if 
the sign were actually written in English. 
A modern-day Dante could imagine a busy 
Husserl taking over old Charon’s job and 
shipping crowds of lost Anglo-American phi-
losophers’ souls over to the place of their eter-
nal punishment (it would be fun to imagine 
more specifically what that might actually be). 
All jokes aside, it is true that the idea of a 
contamination of epistemology with psychol-
ogy, which Husserl regarded as the most 
grievous fault in the laying out of basic princi-
ples for philosophy, is no longer considered 
taboo. Although the strong thesis defended by 
Quine in his famous essay Epistemology Natu-
ralized,2 where a case is made for the replace-
ment of traditional epistemology with psy-
chology, is no longer (and perhaps has never 
been) mainstream, various forms of “natural-
ism” in epistemology gained foothold as philo-
sophically respectable positions. 
Parallel to this development, another area 
of philosophy rapidly moved towards “natu-
ralization”: the philosophy of mind. Most con-
temporary philosophers of mind would likely 
characterize their position as some form of 
“naturalism”. Debates in the field seem to be 
primarily geared towards a solid formulation 
of naturalism, rather than the adjudication of 
its correctness. 
Although naturalism in epistemology and 
naturalism in the philosophy of mind are not 
necessarily part of the same package (at least 
in the sense that not all naturalists about the 
mind are naturalists in epistemology), the two 
projects share important features. It is fair to 
say that in spite of all differences among exist-
ing brands of naturalism, a polemical trait is 
common to them all.  
Epistemological naturalism is a reaction 
against the idea that the requirements for true 
knowledge can be worked out in a purely a 
priori fashion, that is to say, without having to 
consider the empirical makeup of our human 
cognitive system and the deliverances of the 
sciences about it and its environing world. 
Psychological naturalism (which hereafter I 
will use as equivalent to “naturalism in the 
philosophy of mind”) is a reaction against the 
idea that the mind constitutes an immaterial 
substance that is somehow metaphysically 
separated or separable from the body. 
In this paper I will appraise Husserl’s ar-
guments against epistemological and psycho-
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logical naturalism in his seminal essay Philoso-
phy as a Rigorous Science.3 As I wish to show, 
however, the positions Husserl attacks under 
the headings “naturalization of ideas” and 
“naturalization of consciousness” do not en-
tirely square with contemporary variants of 
naturalized epistemology and naturalized psy-
chology. Husserl is concerned with much 
stronger versions of naturalism. When he re-
jects the “naturalization of ideas” he is reject-
ing a brand of so-called psychologism, accord-
ing to which logic and semantics express noth-
ing over and above psychological regularities.  
His position does not revolve around 
whether or not actual natural scientific find-
ings should be left out of consideration in 
epistemology. He only claims that when we do 
epistemology our gaze should be directed to-
wards the invariant structures of scientific 
theorizing rather than its historically variable 
doctrinal contents. In a similar fashion, when 
he rejects the naturalization of consciousness 
he is by no means defending Cartesian sub-
stance dualism or some modified version 
thereof. Suffice to say that, much to the dis-
may of contemporary philosophers of mind, 
on Husserl’s account Descartes is the chief re-
sponsible for the kind of naturalization of 
consciousness that he sets out to combat!  
The naturalization of consciousness for 
Husserl is primarily a mistaken formulation of 
the epistemic aims for a scientific investigation 
of psychic phenomena. This, of course, is based 
on a mistaken ontology of the psyche but this is 
precisely Descartes’ dualistic ontology. 
In the end it might turn out that after all 
some of the philosophical sins committed by 
contemporary thinkers can be considered ve-
nial even by a rigorist like Husserl. However, 
this does not mean that Husserl’s arguments 
are outdated. On the contrary, a careful exam-
ination of them is helpful to identify all too 
strong variants of naturalism that (I hope) 
would be unpalatable also to today’s hardiest 
naturalists.  
More specifically, Husserl’s method for a 
direct investigation of the essential structures 
of consciousness qua consciousness offers 
much needed resources for the continuation 
of work in the philosophy of mind after we 
realize, for instance, with Michael Tye that 
complete reduction of intentionality to brain 
states might be a pipe dream.4 
Here is how I will proceed: in section one I 
will examine Husserl’s critique of the naturali-
zation of ideas and try to position it in the 
context of some contemporary variants of 
naturalized epistemology. Section two will be 
devoted to Husserl’s critique of the naturaliza-
tion of consciousness. In this section I will also 
show why Husserl believes that these two 
types of naturalism belong inseparably togeth-
er. The third and last section shall entail some 
thoughts on what I take to be the lesson that 
we learn from Husserl in Philosophy as a Rig-
orous Science. 
 
█ The inconsistency of epistemological 
naturalism 
 
Larry Laudan gives a helpful definition of 
naturalism in epistemology worth quoting in 
full: 
 
Epistemic naturalism is not so much an 
epistemology per se as it is a theory about 
philosophic knowledge: in very brief com-
pass, it holds that the claims of philosophy 
are to be adjudicated in the same ways that 
we adjudicate claims in other walks of life, 
such as science, common sense and the 
law. More specifically, epistemic natural-
ism is a meta-epistemological thesis: it 
holds that the theory of knowledge is con-
tinuous with other sorts of theories about 
how the natural world is constituted.5 
 
Later in his paper Laudan replaces the 
metaphor of continuity with another, very ef-
fective metaphor, where he writes that: «sci-
ence and philosophy are cut from identical 
cloth».6 This is a good starting point to ap-
proach Husserl’s position. As the title of his 
essay proves, Husserl would emphatically 
agree with Laudan on this last statement. Phi-
losophy, for Husserl, is a rigorous science.  
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However, let us raise a question: what is the 
“cloth”, in Laudan’s metaphor, from which 
both science and philosophy are cut? Regretta-
bly, Laudan does not address this issue but I 
believe he would probably agree that at a min-
imum the cloth from which science and philos-
ophy (more specifically, epistemology) are cut 
is logical cloth.7 Let us think of it this way: Un-
like straightforward scientific theory, which is 
about objects and occurrences in the world, 
epistemology has a different subject matter.  
The subject matter of epistemology is the-
ory itself; it is theory about theory. However, 
both straightforward theories and epistemo-
logical theories share a basic stock of theoreti-
cal ingredients that do not depend on their re-
spective subject matter. 
If we examine any conceivable straight-
forward theory ST, we can first and foremost 
isolate a certain “material” content in it, i.e., 
the segment of reality that ST is about. We can 
engage in a thought experiment (Husserl 
would call this “eidetic variation”) and imag-
ine to vary the “material” content of ST as we 
wished.  
We would thus run through a variety of 
disciplines. The material content of ST (what 
ST is about) would change from, say, physical 
forces, to molecules, to varieties of plants, to 
phonemes and so forth. In all these cases, 
some invariant common features would clear-
ly stand out.  
Regardless of its material content, ST (if it 
has to be a scientific theory) would have to 
make use of certain basic concepts, such as 
“truth”, “evidence”, “concept”, “description”, 
“explanation”, and so forth. Moreover, ST 
should be articulated in a logically consistent 
manner, i.e., in observance of some basic logi-
cal laws, such as the laws of logical inclusion 
and exclusion, the principle of non-contra-
diction, the principle of the excluded middle 
and the like. Spelling out all the ingredients 
that constitute a straightforward scientific 
theory would be a lot of work. However, that 
there are such ingredients should be easily as-
certainable with the aid of the variational 
thought experiment just proposed.8  
If in a further imaginative step we then re-
place the content of ST with non-
straightforward material, i.e., with another 
theory or set of theories, we enter the realm of 
epistemology. Although we have now left be-
hind the straightforward reference to the em-
pirical world, it should be intuitive that the 
same basic conditions obtaining for ST still ob-
tain in the new realm of epistemological theo-
ries, ET.  
If we now carry forward our thought ex-
periment and vary the material content of ET 
as we wished, we run through a variety of epis-
temological theories. We can have epistemo-
logical theories focused primarily on the natu-
ral sciences and epistemological theories fo-
cused on the humanities, some working a pri-
ori and some working a posteriori, some oper-
ating with a coherentist notion of truth and 
some subscribing to more traditional views 
based on correspondence. And, of course, we 
can have naturalized epistemologies.  
Also in the case of ET, however, the same 
stock of basic ingredients we identified for ST 
would remain invariant. ET, too, must operate 
with some notions of “truth”, “evidence”, “ex-
planation”, and the like and observe the laws of 
logic. In the absence of such ingredients we 
would not take ET seriously as a scientific theory.  
We can thus establish that in a very broad 
and minimal sense what makes a theory scien-
tific is not its content but the “form” in which 
this content is articulated. The “form” at issue 
comprises both logical laws (inclu-
sion/exclusion, non-contradiction, excluded 
middle, etc.) and semantic constituents (the 
notions of “truth”, “evidence”, “explanation”, 
just mentioned.) 
The «naturalizing of ideas»9against which 
Husserl launches his attack is a position ac-
cording to which these basic ingredients (both 
logical and semantic) of scientific theorizing 
are themselves natural phenomena, i.e., they 
are «natural laws of thinking»10 which find 
their ultimate justification in spatio-temporal 
physical nature and its empirical laws. In other 
words, it is a position according to which 
knowledge itself is «a certain natural phe-
Epistemological and Psychological Naturalism in Husserl 
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nomenon».11  
Unless calling knowledge a natural phe-
nomenon merely means that it is not a super-
natural phenomenon (i.e., that no poltergeist 
of sorts is doing the work behind our back 
when we think we are cognizing), some refer-
ence to psychology is needed to substantiate 
this claim. A generic appeal to psychology 
such as the one often quoted from Quine’s 
seminal paper,12 however, is not enough.  
One should make an effort to specify what 
kind of clarifying work psychology is sup-
posed to do in regard to the basic theoretical 
constituents in question. Many philosophers 
defending naturalism in epistemology in Hus-
serl’s time specified this idea by interpreting 
the cogency displayed by logically articulated 
theories in terms of psychological necessity.  
For example, when we perceive the connec-
tion between major premise, minor premise 
and conclusion in a well-formed syllogism as 
compelling, this is because three mental states 
occurring in us are linked by an empirically val-
id psychological law, ultimately rooted in the 
physiology of our brain. Logical necessity, on 
this account, is nothing but the experienced 
side of unexperienced psycho-physiological ne-
cessity. 
Husserl (and many other philosophers 
with him) was quick to realize that a purely 
psychological account of knowledge bears fa-
tal consequences for the very notion of epis-
temology. If all necessity that there is is the 
causal necessity of physiological processes in 
the brain with their psychological accompa-
niments, then the very notion of true 
knowledge dissolves and, with the words of 
Jaegwon Kim against Quine, «[w]hat remains 
is a descriptive empirical theory of human 
cognition which […] will be entirely devoid of 
the notion of justification or any other evalua-
tive concept».13  
But on closer inspection the naturalist en-
gaging in a defense of his position, as Husserl 
points out, is refuting himself: «The naturalist 
teaches, preaches, moralizes, reforms. […] But 
he denies what every sermon, every demand, 
if it is to have a meaning, presupposes».14 In 
other words, in order to defend his position 
that the basic theoretical constituents of sci-
ence are nothing but manifestations of psycho-
physiological regularities the epistemological 
naturalist is making use of these constituents.  
He wishes his readers to see the truth of his 
naturalistic theory based on the allegedly 
compelling force of his arguments, while at 
the same time he claims that they are not what 
they purport to be. They bear no special ra-
tional force of their own; they merely feed on 
the force of natural causality. 
Although counter-arguments like this, re-
volving around hidden self-refutation, have 
some undeniable persuasiveness, they are not as 
strong as direct refutation. Husserl remarks that: 
 
Prejudices blind, and one who sees only 
empirical facts and grants intrinsic validity 
only to empirical science will not be par-
ticularly disturbed by absurd consequences 
that cannot be proved empirically to con-
tradict facts of nature.15 
 
This is why, both in Philosophy as a Rigor-
ous Science and in earlier lectures on the rela-
tion between psychology and theory of 
knowledge, Husserl sets out to prove that, up-
on direct examination, the basic constituents 
of theory do not entail any necessary reference 
to mental content. Let us construe an example 
that will hopefully prove Husserl’s point. 
For the sake of simplicity, let us take as a rep-
resentative for all basic theoretical ingredients 
under scrutiny a classic syllogism (S) such as: 
(P) All humans are mortal 
(p) Socrates is human 
(c) Socrates is mortal 
Intuitively, (c) follows necessarily from (P) 
and (p). This necessity can be explained by 
reference to logical inclusion. However, if the 
naturalistic position opposed by Husserl is 
true then the necessity at issue is a case of nat-
ural necessity.  
The segment of nature we would want to 
scrutinize in order to account for the per-
ceived necessity of (S) would be the human 
psyche. Following this suggestion we should 
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be able to ‘embed’ the three different steps in 
(S) in three different mental states and see the 
necessary occurrence of the mental state em-
bedding (c) after a mental state embedding 
(P) and a mental state embedding (p) occur. 
We should be able to rewrite (S) in the follow-
ing way salva veritate: 
(i) If the appropriate psycho-physiological 
conditions obtain, then a psychic subject under-
going the mental state m(P) and subsequently 
the mental state m(p) will necessarily undergo 
the mental state m(c). 
If we want to be serious with the claim that 
the necessity at stake here is natural necessity, 
then the above statement should express the 
same kind of rigid regularity expressed by a 
more patently naturalistic statement like the 
following one: 
(ii) If the appropriate physical conditions ob-
tain, then water necessarily transitions from the 
solid, to the liquid, to the gaseous state. 
However, it is evident that while (ii) is true, 
(i) is at best probable and, most importantly, (i) 
does not translate the ‘logical’ necessity of (S) 
salva veritate. We can easily imagine a psychic 
subject forming the thought that (P) “all hu-
mans are mortal,” subsequently forming the 
thought that (p) “Socrates is human” but then 
getting distracted and forming the thought (z) 
“I need a sandwich” instead of (c) “Socrates is 
mortal.” The series m(P)-m(p)-m(c) and the 
series m(P)-m(p)-m(z) are equally possible. 
The necessity entailed in the initial formulation 
of (S) is thus dissolved and not simply reinter-
preted when (S) is rewritten as (i).  
We can thus conclude with Husserl that 
the kind of necessity characterizing (S) cannot 
be equated with natural necessity based on 
concatenations of mental states. In German 
Husserl (and most anti-psychologistic philos-
ophers) would point out that the necessary 
connection obtaining between (P), (p) and (c) 
is sachlich, i.e., objectively rooted in the state-
of-affairs represented by (S). 
The fact that this objectively valid state-of-
affairs can be grasped by psychic subjects who 
produce the appropriate series of thoughts in 
their minds, does mean that it is itself a psy-
chological state-of-affairs. While m(P), m(p) 
and m(c) may or may not occur in this order 
and can only be instantiated diachronically, 
(P), (p) and (c) belong together in the timeless 
unity of a valid syllogism.  
Of course, whenever we form a correct syl-
logism in our mind a certain concatenation of 
mental states occurs. This, however, does not 
entail that a correct syllogism is a certain con-
catenation of mental states, as the naturalizer 
of ideas would have it. The naturalization of 
ideas is thus a failed attempt to explain logical 
necessity in merely psychological terms.  
Unless the very notions of logical necessity 
and justification are jettisoned and the prima 
facie validity of (S) is dissolved in favor of psy-
chological probability (a solution which may 
perhaps appear palatable only if its relativistic 
consequences are ignored) the different nature 
of logical necessity must be recognized and the 
naturalization of ideas must be abandoned. 
In a desperate attempt to rescue psycholo-
gism some philosophers (notably, Massey 
1991)16 argued that historical changes in logi-
cal theory prove that there is no such thing as 
a “different nature” of logical necessity and 
thus all the laws once deemed fundamental 
and timelessly valid should be dethroned.  
The birth of paraconsistent logic, which al-
legedly violates the principle of non-
contradiction, is produced as evidence that 
timeless validity in logic has been disproved. I 
find these remarks quite puzzling. In particu-
lar, the claim that paraconsistent logic violates 
the principle of non-contradiction seems as 
reasonable as the claim that airplanes violate 
the law of gravity.  
Only if the binding force of the principle of 
contradiction (or the law of gravity) is ade-
quately recognized it is then possible to find 
ways around it, in order to meet certain tech-
nical demands in logic (or transportation). But 
as much as the law of gravity is still valid even 
after the invention of airplanes, the principle 
of non-contradiction still retains its force after 
paraconsistent logic came into the world. In 
the end, after the birth of paraconsistent logic 
a philosophy student who contradicts himself 
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in his final paper will still get an F (or perhaps 
a B + due to grade inflation).  
We will not congratulate him for being up-
to-date with the most recent developments in 
logical theory. However, in the context of the 
present paper we can look at the faulty stu-
dent with some gratitude for offering further 
evidence that the laws governing the empirical 
production of thought do not necessarily co-
incide with the timelessly valid laws of logic 
and cannot account for them. 
 
█ The shortcomings of psychological 
naturalism 
 
Considering his passionate defense of the 
autonomy of the logical and semantic sphere 
from the sphere of psychic phenomena, why 
does Husserl need a phenomenology of con-
sciousness? Isn’t an investigation of the mind 
superfluous for a philosopher who wants to 
defend the scientificity of his discipline? 
Understanding this point adequately is 
critical to understanding what is distinctive 
about Husserl’s anti-psychologism and his 
subsequent articulation of transcendental 
phenomenology. Perhaps unexpectedly, over 
the course of his article, Husserl ends up val-
orizing certain aspects of naturalism.  
He finds the naturalist’s attempt to uphold 
the ideal of scientificity in philosophy admira-
ble.17 There is a sense in which the idea of 
turning towards consciousness and experience 
in order to set the stage for the realization of 
this ideal is guided by good instinct. After all, 
although they cannot be hastily equated with 
thoughts, the basic theoretical constituents 
discussed above nonetheless manifest them-
selves and their validity to consciousness.  
As we said, a psychic subject who forms 
the correct series of thoughts in his mind will 
grasp the logical necessity of the syllogism (S). 
The questions to ask regarding these consid-
erations are: What exactly are we turning to-
wards when we turn towards consciousness 
motivated by philosophical questions? And 
what are the best questions to ask when we 
turn to consciousness as philosophers inter-
ested in a clarification of epistemology? Is a 
turn to consciousness necessarily a psychologi-
cal turn? 
The turn to consciousness operated by the 
naturalizer of ideas is a good idea guided by a 
bad theory, or dogma, which Husserl effec-
tively summarizes as follows: ND (Naturalistic 
Dogma): Whatever is is either itself physical, 
belonging to the unified totality of physical 
nature, or it is in fact psychical, but then mere-
ly as a variable dependent on the physical, at 
best a secondary “parallel accompaniment”.18 
The implicit inferences based on ND and 
propping up the project of naturalizing ideas 
as well as its connection with the project of a 
naturalization of consciousness can thus be 
easily spelled out: Since ideas (basic theoreti-
cal ingredients) are clearly not physical, as per 
ND they must be psychical. And since they are 
psychical, also as per ND, they must be varia-
bles dependent on underlying physical pro-
cesses.  
However, once the straightforward equa-
tion of “ideas” and psychic facts is proved un-
tenable, as I tried to show in section I of this 
paper, some significant revision of ND seems 
to be called for. 
As regards the revision of first part of ND 
(which states that whatever is is either physi-
cal of psychical) a helpful resource had been 
around for a while in Husserl’s time: it was the 
Neo-Kantian’s proposal – based on Hermann 
Lotze’s reading of Plato19 – to renounce the 
language of “being” altogether when dealing 
with ideas and think of them in terms of pure 
“validities” instead. In other words, while it 
may remain true that everything that there is 
is either physical or psychical, what character-
izes items such as syllogisms is not that they 
“are” or “exist” (or fail to do so) but only that 
they “hold valid” [Gelten].  
On this account, we would not need to en-
dorse an unlikely Platonic ontology in order to 
salvage the autonomy of logical, ideal necessi-
ty. Syllogisms do not “exist” or “not exist”, ei-
ther in the mind or in the world, they just hold 
valid. They inhabit what philosophers like 
Sellars and McDowell would call a space of 
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reason, which has rules and necessities of its 
own.20 Questions of existence are thus out of 
place in this context. 
Husserl, however, is much more concerned 
with a significant revision of the second part 
of ND, which states that the psychic is merely 
«a variable dependent on the physical, at best 
a secondary “parallel accompaniment”».21 
Husserl believes that this way of looking at the 
psyche, or better, consciousness is legitimate 
but one-sided. In other words, it prevents us 
from seeing what is really interesting, philo-
sophically speaking, about consciousness, 
which is not its dependency on the body but 
its presentive function or intentionality.  
It is thanks to this fundamental feature of 
consciousness that items of the most disparate 
kinds, ranging from physical objects to objec-
tively valid logical relations are accessible to 
us, without therefore being reduced to intra-
mental entities. Let us see how his argument 
develops. 
Treating consciousness as a mere variable 
dependent on the physical for Husserl is the 
distinctive trait of empirical psychology, one 
that is essentially mediated by the experience 
of consciousness’s inherence in a human body: 
 
It is the task of psychology to explore this 
psychic element scientifically within the 
psychophysical nexus of nature (the nexus 
in which, without question, it occurs), to 
determine it in an objectively valid way, to 
discover the laws according to which it de-
velops and changes, comes into being and 
disappears. Every psychological determina-
tion is by that very fact psychophysical, 
which is to say in the broadest sense […], 
that it has a never-failing physical connota-
tion.22  
 
However – and this is a fundamental move 
in Husserl’s argument – the ascription of con-
sciousness to a human body, which is the un-
questioned presupposition of psychological 
inquiry, already presupposes the presentive 
work of consciousness. We know that we have 
a body, that there are other bodies, that some 
of them are animated like ours and that this is 
because conscious states occur in them, on the 
basis of our conscious experience.  
This is a particularly revealing example of 
the epistemically basic function of conscious-
ness of presenting things to us (including our 
own body), which we can then set out to in-
vestigate scientifically only in a second mo-
ment. Prior to all consideration of psycho-
physical dependencies and even prior to all 
scientific investigation of nature, things are 
there for us, ready to be studied and this is due 
to the constant, intentional work of con-
sciousness.  
All naturalistic investigations, including 
psychological investigations exploring the 
mind-body relationship, presuppose the cog-
nitive accessibility of their objects. This acces-
sibility is granted by conscious experiences. 
Therefore, conscious experiences standing in 
this function (now viewed as what renders 
possible the cognitive access to objects and 
not as cognitively accessed objects) cannot be 
posited alongside the same “sphere” of reality 
of what is accessed through them. This would 
give way to a problematic circularity.  
The presentive, access-granting function 
of conscious experience therefore calls for a 
different consideration, one in which con-
sciousness is not merely a dependent variable, 
an accompaniment of physical processes or an 
explanandum of some natural-scientific theo-
ry. As I will explain below, a full appreciation 
of this point does not entail any concession to 
Cartesian substance dualism but, on the con-
trary, it rules out as forcefully as possible the 
idea that consciousness can be meaningfully 
construed as a substance.  
At this stage of the argument, however, 
Descartes can be helpful to substantiate the 
meaning of intentionality for consciousness, 
even though the conclusions he draws from his 
famous thought experiment have to be reject-
ed. After all, let us recall that the res cogitans/res 
extensa theory is not presented until the fifth of 
his meditations. Husserl’s valorization of Des-
cartes, instead, does not go beyond the first 
pages of the first meditation. If we apply the 
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Cartesian strategy of hyperbolic doubt or the 
more modern version of it known as the ‘brain 
in a vat’ hypothesis we learn something im-
portant about consciousness.  
Even if our having a body were a mere illu-
sion and in fact we were just brains in vats or 
ethereal entities systematically deceived by an 
evil genius, consciousness would continue to 
manifest things to us and to do so in ways that 
can be rigorously studied. The fact that we can 
make sense of Descartes’ scenario in his first 
meditation, i.e., that it is not entirely uncon-
ceivable that our body is an illusion, for Hus-
serl does not entail metaphysical evidence that 
consciousness is a separate substance but only 
indications for the development of new, more 
appropriate science of consciousness itself. 
What does the fact that consciousness 
would retain its intentionality even in the Car-
tesian scenario mean? It means that unlike its 
dependency on a physical body, which is em-
pirical, the intentionality of consciousness, i.e. 
its presentive function is essential to it. This is 
not all: The intentionality of consciousness is 
a general title for a vast array of phenomena 
(perceptions, imaginations, recollections), 
whose essential structures and connections 
bear critical consequences for epistemological 
purposes. Let us consider, for the sake of ex-
emplification, the following statement, ex-
pressing an Essential of Perception: (EP) Percep-
tion always gives its objects perspectivally, i.e, 
through profiles EP clearly does not express an 
empirical fact about perception depending on 
the physiology of our human body.  
In Husserl’s terms, EP is not a psychologi-
cal statement but a purely phenomenological 
insight. Any conceivable minded being who 
were to have perceptions would have to have 
objects given perspectivally. We can establish 
the validity of EP prior to all considerations of 
psychophysical dependencies.  
Understanding EP is crucial to epistemolo-
gy because, for instance, it clarifies why all 
knowledge of empirical physical objects is 
necessarily fallible. Since profiles (broadly 
construed) are only revealed one at a time and 
the object can in principle always reveal new, 
previously hidden sides no knowledge of it can 
be deemed definitive.  
Analogously, the interplay existing be-
tween actual perceptual consciousness and the 
possibility of recollection can clarify our 
awareness of the persistency of physical ob-
jects while we are not actually aware of them. 
This is why Husserl, in a later text, states em-
phatically that «an epistemology without 
phenomenology of perception, recollection, 
imagination and all the above mentioned acts 
of consciousness is nonsense».23  
The possibility of knowledge, which is the 
traditional theme of epistemology, feeds on 
the structures and dynamics of consciousness, 
however, not so much on the empirical 
makeup of psychologically interpreted con-
sciousness but on the essential makeup of pure 
consciousness phenomenologically analyzed. 
Accordingly, we can distinguish conceptually 
between “a phenomenology of consciousness” 
and “a natural science about consciousness”. 
The latter, on Husserl’s account, presupposes 
the former. 
It is only on the basis of what consciousness 
essentially does that we can meaningfully set out 
to determine what consciousness empirically is. 
If we gloss over the essential structures of con-
sciousness per se and move all too quickly to 
explanatory and metaphysical questions about 
its relationship with the body, the scientificity 
of our work is put in jeopardy. This is why 
Husserl is extremely critical of empirical psy-
chology and the philosophy based on it: 
 
The ubiquitous fundamental trait of this 
psychology is to set aside any direct and 
pure analysis of consciousness […] in favor 
of indirect fixations of all psychological or 
psychologically relevant facts, having a 
sense that is at least superficially under-
standable without such an analysis of con-
sciousness, at best an outwardly under-
standable sense. In determining experi-
mentally its psychophysical regularities, it 
gets along in fact with crude class concepts 
such as perception, imaginative intuition, 
enunciation, calculation and miscalcula-
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tion, measure, recognition, expectation, re-
tention, forgetting, etc. And of course, on 
the other hand, the treasury of such con-
cepts with which it operates limits the 
questions it can ask and the answers it can 
obtain.24 
 
In a way similar to the shift from “exist-
ence” to “validity” in our understanding of ide-
as, advocated by the Neo-Kantians, Husserl 
would recommend to leave aside, or suspend 
phenomenologically, all metaphysical questions 
of existence and psychophysical dependency in 
regard to consciousness and consider instead 
what is really interesting about it: not that it ex-
ists in connection with the body or fails to do so 
but that it manifests things to us. 
The history of science is full of cases where 
questions that appeared pressing for centuries 
were willfully pushed aside thus giving rise to 
more tangible progress in a certain discipline. 
Famously, modern physics was born when the 
pressing questions concerning final causes in 
nature were willfully suspended.  
This suspension allowed physicists to look 
more carefully at how nature actually works, 
instead of forcing on it explanatory models 
and demands borrowed from the observation 
of purposiveness in human actions. Similarly, 
for Husserl, suspending the issue of its de-
pendency (or independency) from the physi-
ology of the body would set the stage for a 
first, true progress in the investigation of con-
sciousness.  
Instead of forcing on it explanatory models 
and demands borrowed from the investiga-
tion of physical processes, we would start to 
look more carefully at how consciousness ac-
tually works.  
To the extent that the experimental psy-
chology of his time retarded this much needed 
revolution in the formulation of epistemic 
aims for a scientific investigation of con-
sciousness, Husserl deems it without reserva-
tions “pre-Galilean”.25 Like a geometer draw-
ing triangles on the board is not interested in 
their actual existence but in the ideally valid 
properties of a triangle in general (the essence 
“triangle”, as Husserl would put it), the phe-
nomenologist is not interested in the actual 
existence of conscious states in her or anybody 
else’s mind but in the ideally valid properties 
of consciousness in general – the essence of 
consciousness. 
The issue of intentionality as essential 
property of consciousness has been discussed 
in some length in recent philosophy of mind. 
Self-styled naturalists in this area have been 
struggling with what has been labeled “Bren-
tano’s problem”,26 i.e. «how is it possible for a 
physical system to undergo intentional 
states?».27  
The reason why this is perceived to be a 
problem for philosophy is that the intentional-
ity of consciousness seems, in Fodor’s words, 
«recalcitrant to integration in the natural or-
der».28 Intentional relations can be estab-
lished with non-existing, absent or “generic” 
objects. Nowhere else in the observable world 
there seems to happen anything like this.  
Existing rocks cannot collide with non-
existing or absent rocks in the same way in 
which existing thoughts can be about non-
existing or absent entities. What is perceived 
as alarming about this situation is that if in-
tentionality proves to be a non-natural prop-
erty, then consciousness, which has intention-
ality as its essential property, might turn out to 
be a non-natural entity.  
Without entering into the details of the 
debate ensuing from this issue, let us notice 
that the problematic situation is mostly con-
strued in terms of consciousness having the 
property of intentionality. It is only from this 
point of view that the question “What is the 
kind of thing that instantiates this property?” 
makes sense. But is it legitimate to construe 
consciousness as some kind of carrier of prop-
erties?  
This is for Husserl the really problematic 
point. Just because physical things appearing 
in outer perception allow to be construed in 
terms of properties and their substrates (or 
however we want to call that something in 
which properties inhere) and just because the 
whole notion of logical quantification revolves 
Epistemological and Psychological Naturalism in Husserl 
 
157 
around the idea that there has to be some x 
that P, this does not yet prove that the proper-
ty/substrate model is the most appropriate to 
describe consciousness.  
If we jettison this whole model and pro-
ceed to a direct description oriented towards 
the essential features of consciousness, we are 
relieved of all worries about consciousness 
possibly being some murky non-natural, free-
floating immaterial substance as the result of 
its instantiating an allegedly non-natural 
property. It is no surprise that most psycho-
logical naturalists have been struggling to find 
ways to prove that conscious states are in 
some way identical with brain states.  
If the property/substrate scheme is accept-
ed to describe consciousness, then it seems ex-
tremely urgent to prove that the carrier of in-
tentionality is something that fits in the natu-
ral world. But what if this scheme were simply 
abandoned when we deal with consciousness? 
Then we probably would not need to worry 
anymore about consciousness possibly being 
some non-natural substance.  
Consciousness, on this account, would 
simply be no substance at all. It would entirely 
coincide with its intentional function and ex-
perience would provide enough evidence that 
this intentional function occurs empirically in 
certain physiological bodies such as our own. 
An adequate understanding of this point 
reveals why Husserl believes Descartes is the 
chief responsible for the naturalization of con-
sciousness, as he understands it. Suggesting 
that consciousness is a different species under 
the genus “res”, substance, which also includes 
physical nature, Descartes dictated a number 
of misleading questions to later psychology 
(and we should add, to the philosophy of 
mind), questions whose discontinuation is 
critical to a truly scientific investigation of 
consciousness.  
Accordingly, to naturalize consciousness 
for Husserl is primarily to ask certain questions 
about consciousness rather than other, i.e., 
questions about the derivation of conscious 
states from physiological processes. These 
questions, however, only touch on empirical, 
non-essential features of consciousness. They 
are of prime importance only if the Cartesian 
property/substrate model is tacitly accepted.  
However, they are not the most interesting 
or meaningful questions to ask if an investiga-
tion of consciousness is to be rendered fruitful 
in philosophy and epistemology. Empirically, 
consciousness is dependent on a physical body 
and conscious experiences are in principle ex-
plainable by reference to the physiology of the 
brain, even if, as Michael Tye speculates, this 
might be a task that we simply cannot fulfill.29  
Husserl would be extremely reluctant to 
accept contemporary talk of an “explanatory 
gap” or a residue of “irreducible phenomenal 
qualia”.30 Direct experience tells us that con-
sciousness is embodied throughout. However, 
the mere ascertainment of this fact leaves us 
clueless about the essential structures of con-
sciousness that cannot be grasped with the aid 
of natural-scientific quantitative methods.  
Whereas in natural science the notion of 
substances, i.e., of abiding objects having per-
manent physical properties and manifesting 
themselves in the changing flux of our experi-
ence as the same, is fully motivated, there is no 
such thing as a mental substance that underlies 
all conscious experiences and can be deter-
mined as it is in itself with mathematical tools: 
 
Psychical being, being as “phenomenon”, is 
in principle not a unity that could be expe-
rienced in several separate perceptions as 
individually identical, not even in percep-
tions of the same subject. In the psychical 
sphere there is, in other words, no distinc-
tion between appearance and being, and if 
nature is a being that appears in appear-
ances, still appearances themselves […] do 
not constitute a being which itself appears 
by means of appearances lying behind it. 
[…] A phenomenon, then, is no “substan-
tial” unity; it has no “real properties”, it 
knows no real parts, no real changes, and 
no causality.31 
 
If the very notion of substance (which 
hinges on a distinction between an abiding 
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substrate and its properties) is out of place in 
the sphere of consciousness, then the very 
terms of the Cartesian problem are dissolved.  
The recognition of intentionality as the es-
sential, non-naturalistic trait of consciousness 
does not offer resources to substance dualism 
at all. Contrariwise, it discourages any attempt 
to conceive of consciousness in terms that are 
alien to it.  
 
█ Conclusion 
 
Let me conclude with a brief recapitulation 
of Husserl’s analysis and a few remarks about 
the lesson I think we learn from them. 
In Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, Husserl 
connects the naturalization of ideas, according 
to which the basic constituents of theory are 
natural phenomena, and the naturalization of 
consciousness, according to which what is es-
sential to consciousness is its dependency on 
the physiology of the body.  
Against these positions he argues that as 
much as what is essential to ideas cannot be 
reduced to mental processes, what is essential 
to consciousness cannot be reduced to physio-
logical dependency. As regards the first claim, 
he is not advocating some form of ontological 
Platonism. His point is only that the logical 
validity that constitutes the backbone of both 
empirical science and philosophy does not boil 
down to mere psychological regularity.  
As for the second claim, Husserl does not 
believe, as some contemporary philosophers 
of mind do, that the essential feature of con-
sciousness qua consciousness, intentionality, 
could be used to support Cartesian substance 
dualism. On the contrary, while he maintains 
that consciousness is empirically connected to 
a body and therefore empirical physiological 
dependencies between consciousness and 
body cannot be denied, he points out that an 
adequate understanding of consciousness in 
its presentive function rules out the possibility 
to treat consciousness as a substance, a notion 
that is only applicable to physical bodies. 
Husserl’s analysis, I believe, teaches us that 
the questions we are most immediately 
prompted to ask and the explanatory models 
that we are most customarily inclined to ap-
ply, both in philosophy and in empirical sci-
ence, are not necessarily the most interesting 
or pertinent to advance our understanding of 
crucial issues.  
So, for instance, the prima facie centrality of 
the question concerning the relationship be-
tween mind and body reveals to hinge on a 
problematic interpretation of consciousness as 
a substance construed in a way similar to bod-
ies in nature. The endless rivers of ink that 
flowed in recent years to articulate a plausible 
response to Cartesian dualism, for instance, 
could have been better spent if a serious reflec-
tion on the presuppositions of the very ques-
tion asked – which appears so plainly meaning-
ful at first blush – had been carried out.  
Alarmism about intentionality and the fear 
that an unbiased acceptance of its essential, 
non-naturalistic structure would open the 
door to unpalatable metaphysical conclusions 
depended on the failure to actually delve into 
the rich texture of consciousness and subject it 
to direct investigation.  
With a few exceptions, several discussions 
of naturalism in epistemology failed to ad-
dress the actually crucial issue, which is not 
whether or not philosophers ought to ignore 
empirical science, but how are we to under-
stand the identical “cloth”, to reiterate Lau-
dan’s expression, out of which philosophy and 
science are cut. 
At the end of the day, perhaps, a good 
chunk of recent philosophical literature did 
not commit any mortal sin against the eternal 
spirit of philosophy, as Husserl puts it, but 
definitely did commit the venial sin of dissi-
pating precious intellectual energies on ques-
tions that are philosophically interesting only 
at first glance. 
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